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THE DAYTON ACCORD: DEFINING SUCCESS

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ABSTRACT

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The Dayton Accord was initialed on November 21, 1995 and was formally signed in Paris, on December 14, 1995. It is a negotiated settlement that required compromises by all parties concerned. Its principal feature is establishment of a single state of Bosnia-Herzegovina within its pre-war borders. The state is comprised of two separate republics, a Muslim-Croat republic known as the Federation, and the Bosnian Serb Republic. With implementation proceeding more or less on schedule, it is prudent to ask whether the agreement reached in Dayton can provide the basis for a permanent peace. Two theories of nationalism, modernism and primordialism, provide a framework within which the fundamental nature and underlying causes of the war are analyzed. The paper discusses how modernists and primordialists might explain why the war occurred, who is to blame, and what the long term prospects for peace are. It concludes that the long term prospects for peace are not good, because the Dayton Accord implements a modernist solution to a primordial problem. Failure to understand and account for the primordial aspects of the war may result in a resumption of the fighting after NATO's departure.

INTRODUCTION

In October 1995, the United States successfully negotiated a sixty-day cease fire that stopped more than three and a half years of fighting in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The cease fire, which went into effect on October 12, 1995, paved the way for the historic proximity peace talks which were held at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio.¹ The Dayton Accord was initialed on November 21, 1995, and formally signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. The agreement uses a modernist approach to end the war. It focuses on measures such as establishment of a unitary, multi-national state, and the immediate scheduling of elections without due regard for the primordial factors that led to the war in the first place. The prospect for Dayton to lead to a permanent settlement is poor because the agreement ignores the primordial aspects of the war.

Regardless of political affiliation, or sympathies toward the belligerents, most analysts would agree "that Mr. Richard Holbrooke of the American State Department has probably achieved the best possible agreement that could be reached under the circumstances."² The negotiations successfully stopped the fighting, but now that implementation is underway, it is both appropriate and necessary to define what constitutes success and to determine the likelihood of achieving it.

The Dayton Accord is a statement by the parties that they recognize the need for a comprehensive settlement to the conflict, and it includes their commitment to conduct future relations in a peaceful manner. It is a "General Framework Agreement" that provides guidelines for a number of military and civilian actions designed to separate the warring parties, and to facilitate the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³ It is not a final agreement, but rather a starting point toward a comprehensive settlement. To explain the American rationale behind the Dayton Accord, Secretary of State Warren Christopher told members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that "the agreement initialed in Dayton advances our national interests and gives us every reason to believe that peace can take hold in Bosnia."⁴

The reconstruction of Bosnia will require several years but the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) which provides the military security necessary to implement the agreement only has a twelve month mandate.⁵ This has many people concerned about

what will happen after IFOR departs. President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake explained that the purpose of IFOR is to: "Implement very clearly defined military missions that will achieve a real difference on the ground; separation of forces, a cease fire, patrolling of a demilitarized zone between the forces; and that should create a secure environment in Bosnia that will allow other changes such as elections for a central government."⁶ According to Secretary of Defense William Perry, the IFOR mission was set at one year because the Department of Defense believes that "One year will be sufficient to break the cycle of violence and to create a secure environment..."⁷ The assumption that the cycle of violence can be broken in twelve months shows a lack of appreciation for the depth of ethnic hatred between the factions. The overall purpose of the Dayton Accord is to provide a framework within which the warring parties can begin the process of establishing a comprehensive peace. Now that the IFOR has provided a secure environment, the question is whether the belligerents will use this opportunity to construct a permanent peace, or if they will merely use the time to rest, rearm, and to eventually resume the conflict.

To determine whether the Dayton Accord has laid the foundation upon which a permanent peace can be built, it is necessary to have an in-depth understanding of the fundamental nature of the war. If third parties such as the United States and NATO wish to play a positive role in the peace process they have to understand the complex dynamics of the conflict. It is important to view the war within the wider context of the overall Yugoslav drama, because to do otherwise may lead to false conclusions. Also, how a third-party such as the United States or NATO defines the war will go far in determining the attitude taken toward the belligerents. Furthermore, if the peace process fails to correctly comprehend and address the underlying causes of the war, we may find that we have applied a band-aid to a trauma patient.

THE MODERNIST-PRIMORDIALIST DEBATE

It is instructive to frame the war within the theoretical construct of two popular theories of nationalism. These theories, modernism and primordialism cannot fully explain the events that occurred in Bosnia, but they are useful in helping to understand the divisions and differences between the perceptions of key regional experts and

policymakers. Thus, to the extent possible this theoretical framework will be used to analyze events and the views of various commentators.

Analysis of the nature and causes of the war as viewed through the modernist and primordialist perspectives leads to the conclusion that the potential for the Dayton Accord to lead to a permanent peace is poor. The underlying causes of the war in Bosnia are far more complex than most observers recognize. Some evidence suggests that the immediate causes of the conflict are contemporary or modern in origin, but a deeper examination reveals that the root causes of the conflict have primordial origins.

The essence of the modernist-primordialist debate lies in how each side views the development of the nation as a political and social entity. Modernists believe that the nation is a *modern* institution dating from the eighteenth century, while primordialists claim that the nation has existed since *antiquity*. The relevance of these distinctions with respect to the war in Bosnia lies in the importance placed on nationalism and ethnicity. Modernists perceive the war to be the result of relatively contemporary social, political, and economic issues, while the primordialists place a heavier emphasis on ethnic, tribal, and cultural differences between the groups.

Ernest Gellner, a leading modernist, stated that "mankind has passed through three fundamental stages in its history: the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, and the industrial."⁸ During the pre-agrarian stage, humans hunted for subsistence in small groups that did not promote the formation of states or nations. In the agrarian stage states were fairly prevalent, but the principal concern of that epoch was to provide subsistence, not to develop nationalism. It was not until the industrial age, that nationalism and nations came into being.⁹ The theory states that societies passing through the stages of modernization and industrialization became highly mobile, educated, and technologically equipped. Karl Deutsch, tells us that this process of modernization "in the form of increases in urbanization, industrialization, schooling, communication and transportation facilities, and so on would lead to assimilation, thereby reducing the antagonisms between diverse cultures."¹⁰ But this isn't always the case. As Anthony Smith points out, the competition for scarce resources in the cities leads to a form of class conflict, that can ultimately result in the formation of separate nations within a geographic area.¹¹

In contrast, primordialists believe that nations existed in antiquity, and survived

all of the epochs and stages of mankind's development. Leading primordialists such as Clifford Geertz and Edward Suils refer to psychological ties that are formed as a result of common linguistic, racial, tribal, regional, or religious background as the fundamental national identities.¹² Just as the nations themselves weathered the storms of industrialization and modernization, so too did the nationalism of these groups. As these nations developed, the importance of primordial ties such common language, race, and religious background was not eliminated. Obviously, all nations did not exist unchanged throughout history. Many nations disappeared over time, or were assimilated into other groups. Some nations were subsumed but not eliminated. The nationalism associated with those nations might lay dormant for years with the possibility that it could be reawakened at any time. Thus in the eyes of a primordialist, the root causes of a contemporary ethnic conflict could be based on "reawakened nationalism" inspired by ancient or historic grievances.

Both theories offer explanations of nationalism that can lead to conflict, but they look at different causes. Since modernists believe that nationalism is a recent phenomenon, they are inclined to look at contemporary social, political, and economic developments as the likely causes of conflict. A primordialist would say that you have to look deep into the history of the warring factions to understand the causes of war. Interestingly, it seems that most modernists are political scientists, while the majority of primordialists are sociologists.¹³ As William T. Johnsen eloquently put it, "What these nations are now depends on where they were when."¹⁴ This paraphrase of sociology Professor Morris Massey's famous work shows the relationship between primordialism and sociology and makes the point that a nation is the sum of its cultural and historical experiences.

This brief introduction of the debate suffices to set the stage for analysis. Modernism and primordialism are complex theories that have been reduced to simple terms for the purposes of this paper. In spite of the risk of oversimplification this is nonetheless a practical framework within which to analyze the conflict.

DEFINING THE WAR

The first step to solving any problem is to start with a clear definition of the

problem. There are many ideas as to the nature of the war, but only the two most prominent views will be discussed here. Most analysts either believe that it is a war of aggression or that it is a civil war.

Modernists believe that the war in Bosnia is a territorial war of state aggression. This is the view held by the United States, Austria and Germany; that the war is the result of Serbian territorial aggression against the independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁵ In other words, a war of aggression by one state against another state. One reason that the war is commonly thought to be a war of aggression is due to the high-profile and aggressive nature of Serbian nationalism. In 1986, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences published the *Serbian Memorandum* which was a blueprint for future Serbian nationalism. Its publication is frequently cited as the "defining moment and a traceable catalyst to the recent series of events in Bosnia-Herzegovina."¹⁶ The *Memorandum* contains passages that clearly frightened the citizens of Yugoslavia's other republics. Among other things, it reiterated the age-old quest to establish a "greater Serbia," and it "maintained that the only way to rectify the damage done by the Communists to Serbia's legitimate national agenda, was "to be achieved by uniting all Serbs in a single Serbian national state."¹⁷ It is also a fact that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic rose to power on a highly nationalist platform. After rejecting the Carrington Plan in 1991 Milosevic reminded us of his nationalist agenda by telling the Serb people: "They propose splitting Yugoslavia into independent states. This would fragment the Serb nation. We Serbs would end up scattered among several republics. We'd be in mortal danger."¹⁸ The war is seen as a deliberate extension of the long-range nationalist plans laid out in the *Memorandum*.

Writers such as Norman Cigar trace Serbian nationalism from publication of the *Memorandum*, to the attack by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) on Slovenia, along a continuum of carefully planned events aimed at the creation of an expanded Serbian state. The depth of Mr. Cigar's conviction that the war in Bosnia was all part of a Serbian master plan can be seen in this strongly worded statement contained in his book on ethnic cleansing:

This study contends that the genocide - or ethnic cleansing, as it has been commonly known - that befell the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina was not simply

the unintentional and unfortunate by-product of combat or civil war. Rather, it was a rational policy, the direct and planned consequence of conscious policy decisions taken by the Serbian establishment in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. This policy was implemented in a deliberate and systematic manner as part of a broader strategy intended to achieve a well-defined, concrete, political objective, namely, the creation of an expanded, ethnically pure greater Serbia.¹⁹

Cigar discounts the role that history played in shaping the events that led to the war except for Serbia's historical quest for a national state. He views the will to establish a "greater Serbia" as the basis and the core element of Serbian nationalist ideology. Cigar painstakingly traces the history of Serbian nationalist goals from the period of Ottoman rule to the present. According to Cigar, the drive for a "greater Serbia" motivated Milosevic and other Serbian nationalists to purposely engineer the policy of genocide as part of an overall premeditated strategy to achieve it.²⁰

To support his contention, Cigar cites circumstantial evidence, such as this statement by Branimir Savovic, Bosnian Serb mayor of the Bosnian city of Visegrad, who pointed out that it was not the Bosnian Serbs who had coined the phrase "All Serbs in a single state."²¹ The implication is that Serbia not only engineered the war, but that it also directed the commission of atrocities in Bosnia and Croatia.

Another writer who holds a similar view is Noel Malcolm. In his book, Bosnia: A Short History, Malcolm develops the historical basis for recognition of a Bosnian state. He rejects the argument that the war in Bosnia was the result of a spontaneous civil war. In his view, "one sees that the real causes of Bosnia's destruction have come from outside Bosnia itself, and have done so twice over: first in the form of the political strategy of the Serbian leadership, and then in the form of the miscomprehension and fatal interference of the leaders of the West."²² Malcolm explains, that:

The biggest obstacle to all understanding of the conflict is the assumption that what has happened in that country is the product - natural, spontaneous and at the same time necessary - of forces lying within Bosnia's own internal history. That is which was carefully propagated by those who caused the conflict, who wanted the world to believe that what they and their gunmen were doing was done not by them, but by impersonal and inevitable forces beyond anyone's control.²³

Most primordialists would argue that Serbia's aggressive nationalism is not alone responsible for the tragic dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent violence in Bosnia.

The shooting-war started when Slovenia unilaterally declared independence. The federal government of Yugoslavia ordered the YPA to use armed force to prevent Slovenia's secession. Because the actions of the YPA were directed from the state level, this has been construed by some to have been a case of interstate aggression. But the nature of the war is far too complex to be simply ascribed to Serbian nationalism. As Johnsen warned:

Not one war, but a menlange of wars is currently being waged within the former Yugoslavia. Elements of interstate aggression (e.g., initial Yugoslav National Army actions in Slovenia and Croatia (1991), continued Serbian Army support for ethnic Bosnian and Croatian Serbs), civil/ethnic war (e.g., ethnic Croats, Muslims, and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina), religious conflict between Muslims and Christians, limited war (United States and NATO approach) versus total war (i.e., wars of survival for the various ethnic groups), personal power (e.g., Abdic, Karadic, and Milosevic), and psychopaths who simply enjoy the killing all exist within the conflict raging in the Balkans. Therefore, in developing potential solutions, policymakers must pursue options that, at best, address as many of these individual conflicts as possible. At the least, negotiators must not pursue resolution of one factor at the expense of others, for doing so may only exacerbate another element, prolonging war in the region.²⁴

Focusing exclusively on the interstate aggression aspect of the war ignores other crucial facts. As we shall see, Slovenia unilaterally seceded from an internationally recognized state. Next followed the war in Croatia, which again was precipitated by a unilateral declaration of sovereignty. In response, the approximately 600,000 Serbs in Croatia rebelled. The argument that Slovenia and Croatia could secede from Yugoslavia, but that Serbs living in Croatia did not have a reciprocal right to self-determination defies logic. Milosevic made no secret of the fact that Serbia was willing to allow Croatia to peacefully leave the federation, but without the 600,000 Serbs who lived there.²⁵ Finally, finding themselves faced with the prospect of living in a Serbia-dominated state, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats voted to secede from Yugoslavia as well. Once again, a substantial Serb minority, this time comprising approximately a third of the total population of Bosnia, chose to break away and form their own republic. The result of these secessions has been a series of civil wars that have dragged on for more than four years. Although the YPA clearly overreacted in Slovenia, the fact is that the war was more an act of frustration and confusion than part of an overall plan. Although much has

been made of the YPA's actions in Slovenia, it should be remembered that the entire "war" lasted exactly one week, and resulted in about sixty dead and approximately five hundred wounded.²⁶ Considering the size and strength of the federal army at that time it is difficult to believe that they waged a pre-planned, aggressive territorial war. For many people, the controlling factor that determines whether this is a war of aggression or a civil war is the degree to which unilateral secession can be justified. If Yugoslavia was an internationally recognized state, then it is questionable whether individual republics had the right to unilaterally secede. If secession based on the right to self-determination was justified, then it would also be arguable that national groups within the republics had the same right.

A brief look at the situation in Canada illustrates the complexity of the secession issue. The state of Canada conceded to the people of Quebec province the right to determine their future status. The native Indians who live in Quebec stated that if Quebec secedes, that they will secede from Quebec and join Canada. The waters of self-determination get even muddier when considering the city of Montreal. Montreal is one of Quebec's most important urban areas. So far, the people of Montreal have opposed separatism and have threatened to remain in Canada if Quebec secedes. The Canadian government position is that if Quebec is afforded the right to self-determination, then the same right must be further extended to the Indians and the city of Montreal. None of this is to suggest that Canada is about to erupt into a ethnonational conflict. As Ted Gurr noted, the western democracies have developed strategies of accommodation that minimize the possibility of ethnic violence. In the case of Canada, Gurr says: "There is one positive conclusion about the norms and practices of Canadian democracy. They may not be able to forestall Quebec's eventual secession, but they virtually ensure that the impending divorce will be peaceful: very few Canadians are prepared to go to war for either a free Quebec or a united Canada."²⁷ The Quebec case is only used to illustrate that the question of secession and self-determination is a complex issue with a double-edged blade.

It is helpful to look at Allen Buchanan's theory of secession to better understand the requirements for a justifiable secession. In the 1980's, Buchanan noted the growth of a worldwide renewal of nationalism that had the potential to spawn numerous

secessionist movements. He was concerned that there were no theories to explain secession or to guide governments and statesmen that had to deal with secessionist movements. In 1991 he offered a normative theory of secession to fill the void.²⁸ Buchanan outlined arguments that both favored and opposed the principle that separatist groups have a moral right to secede from their parent state. He concluded that under certain, very strictly conditioned circumstances, a moral right to secede does exist. In short, secession might be morally justified if: 1) the parent state has already refused to rectify serious injustices against the secessionist group; 2) the types of state-inflicted injustices used to justify secession include violations of basic civil and political rights, or the discriminatory exploitation of the secessionist group by the state; 3) the secessionist group must protect the survival of its culture from threats by either a third-party or the state itself. Buchanan further stipulated that if the state owns the title to the territory that the secessionist group intends to secede with, "then only the most weighty reasons, namely, a grievance of state-perpetuated injustice or the necessity of self-defense against threats to the literal survival of the members of the group, can justify secession."²⁹

The question of secession is one of the most important issues in the overall Yugoslav drama, and is central to an understanding of what happened. Some analysts will argue that Yugoslavia could not survive as a state because it never existed as a nationality.³⁰ On the other hand, some like Paul Mojzes make it clear that a distinct *Yugoslav* identity did exist:

As a child and young man I came under the influence of Tito's brand of socialism. In particular I found Tito's efforts to build "*bratstvo-jedinstvo*" (brotherhood and unity) very appealing. My generation, at least in the Vojvodina region of Serbia and in Belgrade, did not consider national origin a factor of importance. When asked our nationality, most of my friends identified themselves as Serb; my only brother identified himself as Serb, and I was a Croat. My best friend was Hungarian and my second-best friend Slovenian. We really did feel primarily *Yugoslav*, an identity which is supposedly artificial but which is no more imaginary than [sic] the mythic nationalism of the nineteenth century that created the categories of Serb, Croat, Slovene, and other labels attached to peoples who previously saw themselves as merely related to small geographic regions of the Balkan peninsula and to their religion.³¹

Yugoslavia was more than an artificial federation of separate nations. It existed for approximately seventy years as a multi-national, sovereign state. In spite of the real

constitutional grievances against Serbia, Yugoslavia was nonetheless an internationally recognized state. There is little to indicate that conditions were severe enough to satisfy Buchanan's criteria of moral secession. Even if one disagrees with the conduct of the Yugoslav federal government, it seems that this was a civil war, or more accurately stated, a series of civil wars precipitated by several acts of unilateral secession.

UNDERSTANDING THE WAR

The war in Yugoslavia was not simply a war of territorial aggression, but rather a series of civil wars. In an effort to understand who is responsible for these wars it is necessary to understand their basic nature. Most modernists would date the start of the war in April, 1992, citing social, political, and economic factors of relatively recent origin as the principal causes of the war. Some might place the origin of those social, political, and economic factors at the death of Josip Broz Tito in May 1980, while others might be willing to look as far back as the end of the Second World War, but all of them would reject the notion that the war is rooted in ancient or historical ethnic quarrels. The following statement by Susan Woodward is typical of the way that a modernist would view the war. "The conflict is not a result of historical animosities and it is not a return to the precommunist past; it is the result of the politics of transforming a socialist society to a market economy and democracy."³² One of the basic premises of modernism is that the cultural and ethnic distinctions within a society lose their significance as education, mobility, and technological advances continuously dilute the society's loyalty to and reliance on cultural and ethnic ties. Cultural and ethnic ties are replaced by the state or the nation as the most important source of identity and unity. Thus, cultural and ethnic factors should not be strong enough to bring groups into conflict.

During the earliest stages of the conflict, there were frequent comments that this *new* war in the Balkans had ancient roots. The story went that the people who lived there had been fighting for centuries, and that their hatreds were so deep, and so old, that it would be fruitless for a third party to intervene. This is the primordialist argument in its purest form. Primordialists would not find it necessary to pinpoint a precise starting point, because time isn't necessarily the critical factor. What is important to the

primordialist is to ensure that the effects of ethnic, religious, cultural, and national differences on the causes of the conflict are properly acknowledged. These differences, the primordialists would argue, did not arise in the modern or post-modern world, but are derived from the historical development of these societies over time.

Both arguments are partly correct. It is impossible to understand the war without a thorough knowledge of Balkan history. But to say that historical events are important to an understanding of contemporary issues, is not to excuse or explain them away. A conflict that has primordial origins and appears to be intractable cannot be simply ignored, and the people responsible for the war's conduct cannot be summarily excused. Indeed, nearly all of the analysts who urge an understanding of the historical and cultural aspects of the war simultaneously warned against overstating the arguments.³³ Ted Gurr chose a moderate approach when this generalized view of why it is necessary to understand the importance that communal groups can have on ethnic conflict:

It should be clear that we disagree with observers who (a) think of communal groups as primordial social entities based on biological, cultural, linguistic, and religious givens and (b) regard the states that govern them as inherently artificial entities. ...We also disagree with observers who take this argument to the other extreme and regard communal groups as merely one kind of transitory association created to pursue members' material and political interests.³⁴

HOW THE WAR STARTED

On 25 June, 1991 the former Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia declared themselves sovereign and independent states in spite of warnings that the federal government of Yugoslavia would use armed force to prevent their secession.

By most accounts, the Slovenes were the innocent victims of Serbian aggression. However, this analysis finds that Slovenia was not entirely innocent. As Misha Glenny pointed out, "The war in Croatia had a variety of complex causes but one of the most important was this combination of Slovene uncompromising self-interest and Serbian inflexibility which began the process ending in war between Serbs and Croats."³⁵ Glenny isn't the only person who believes that Slovenia shares in the blame for the war. Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker also placed part of the blame on Slovenia. In

response to a question asked at a congressional hearing in March 1992, Baker said, "Why did the war break out? Because the borders of Yugoslavia were changed by force."³⁶ Modernists would likely assert that Slovenia, as a sovereign republic in a federal state merely exercised its right to secede, and that any interference in its secession must be considered illegal in the eyes of the international community. The primordialist might counter by saying, that although Slovenia may have been a republic in a federation, it was tied ethnically and culturally to the other republics in the federation, and did not have the right to unilaterally secede. The tribal and ethnic ties between Serbs was a powerful emotion that should not have been ignored in the decision to secede.

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the question of secession and the right to self-determination was one of the most divisive issues within the European Community and NATO. Germany and Austria led the West in supporting the secessionists. Germany announced its intention to unconditionally recognize Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence in spite of strong opposition by the United States, France, and Britain. Misha Glenny superbly explains not only the significance of Germany's decision to Slovenia and Croatia, but more importantly, the relationship between Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and the ultimate outbreak of war in Bosnia. According to Glenny, Alija Izetbegovic, the President of Bosnia clearly understood that German recognition of Croatia would lead to a war in Bosnia. Izetbegovic was so convinced of this that he made a trip to Germany, and tried in vain to convince German Chancellor Kohl to postpone recognition. Glenny characterized the unilateral German decision to support Slovenian and Croatian independence as the "death sentence for Bosnia-Herzegovina."³⁷

This is not intended as an argument against secession. As a matter of fact, it can be argued from the primordialist perspective that the ethnonational differences between the peoples of the six Yugoslav republics precluded the long-term survival of the state. Perhaps Crnobraja and others are correct in their assessment that Yugoslavia was doomed to failure as a state, because it never existed as a nation.³⁸ The point here is not to argue against Slovenia's had a right to secede, but to show that the timing and the manner in which the secession occurred was morally wrong, and further, that this secession helped

create the environment for the bloodshed that was to follow. Crnobrnja characterized it very well by saying, "It can be said that the Serbs loaded the gun but the Slovenes and Croats actually fired the first shot at Yugoslavia."³⁹

One argument in favor of Slovenia's right to secede is that the Serbian-dominated federal system had lost its constitutional legitimacy. The straw that broke the camel's back for Slovenia came in May 1991, when Bora Jovic, a Serb, refused to surrender the position of the rotating chair of the federal presidency to the new duly elected president, Stipe Mesic, of Croatia. While this is frequently cited as proof-positive that the Serbs had completely destroyed the last vestiges of constitutional order, the facts in the case are seldom explained. Mesic was a staunch Croatian nationalist who had campaigned in Croatia on the promise that if elected, he would preside over the dismantling of the federal state. In fact, as Crnobrnja notes, "Mesic did walk triumphantly into the Croatian Sabor six months later declaring, to the exuberant cheers of Croatian nationalists, 'I have accomplished my mission - Yugoslavia is no more!'"⁴⁰ It is interesting that the federal government should be criticized for refusing to seat a president who was elected on a vow to dismantle the very government that he presumed to lead.

Bogdan Denitch suggests that there was a certain amount of greed and economic self-interest in the Slovene decision to leave Yugoslavia. Prior to 1988 Slovenia had an unemployment rate of less than two percent, in contrast to the Yugoslav average of fourteen percent. Also, the fact that ten percent of Slovenia's work force came from poorer, Muslim, Croat and Serbian areas had resulted in a grass roots resentment against their fellow Yugoslavian citizens.⁴¹ A final point should be made about Slovenia's declaration of sovereignty. At the precise time that Slovenia and Croatia were moving toward independence, the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic, a Croatian, was making a last ditch heroic effort to save the state. Susan Woodward provides an extremely detailed and thoughtful discussion of the attempts made by Markovic and others to achieve the peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia from a socialist to a market economy. According to Woodward, Yugoslavia's dissolution actually began in the 1970s as a result of a massive crisis in the international monetary system. When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acted to save the monetary system, interest rates on the U.S. dollar skyrocketed, resulting in an immediate increase of foreign debt by all countries that held

debt in U.S. dollars.⁴² One of the countries significantly affected was Yugoslavia, which had borrowed heavily in the 1970s. Woodward states that the problems were attributable to a certain extent to a failure of successive Yugoslav governments in the 1970s to adjust to changes in the international trade system. By 1983, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) appointed a commission to study the country's economic problems. The commission proposed a series of sweeping revisions to the 1974 Constitution that imposed austere economic measures, while simultaneously reducing the economic powers of the separate republics.⁴³ By the late 1980s and early 1990s the austerity measures imposed by Markovic, and which were being required by the IMF and the World Bank, fueled the growing discontent in Slovenia and helped to hasten their decision to leave Yugoslavia. The loss of its most economically stable republic could not help but have a bad effect on Yugoslavia. According to Buchanan, the requirement to achieve distributive justice morally precludes the unilateral secession of the "better off" from the "worse off." Noting that "...many residents of Slovenia have voiced a desire to secede from the poorer, more undeveloped regions constituting Yugoslavia,"⁴⁴ he hinted that Slovenia could be a case where the "better offs" might have been morally constrained from unilateral secession.

The United States initially opposed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. On June 21, 1991, Secretary of State James Baker stated America's intention to deny recognition, saying that the United States would view secession as "illegal and illegitimate."⁴⁵ The United States believed that the only chance for a peaceful transformation of Yugoslavia was through the federal government, and that a unilateral secession would mean war. As David Gompert noted:

U.S. policy prior to hostilities was not motivated by an attachment to a unified Yugoslavia but by a judgment, which proved all too correct, that a peaceful breakup was infeasible. American strategic interest in the integrity of Yugoslavia, per se, ended with the collapse of the Soviet threat to Europe. By late 1990 the overriding U.S. concern about Yugoslavia was to avert a Balkan war. Washington believed that a disintegration of Yugoslavia was bound to be violent because Serbs would sooner fight than accept minority status in an independent Croatia; that the fighting would engulf much of Yugoslavia, because the urge of each republic to secede would grow as others seceded; and that the human toll would be terrible, because Yugoslavia was seething with both weapons and latent hate-fear. (The grisly particulars - detention camps, ethnic

cleansing, mass rapes, shelling of civilian populations - were not predicted, though perhaps they could have been.) Those who criticize the Bush administration for contributing to the outbreak of the conflict by favoring unity have yet to explain how favoring disunity would have prevented the conflict.⁴⁶

It is obvious that Slovenia and Croatia acted selfishly. After all, as Crnobrnja said, this was "Mostly about *borders*! It was not a war of ideological differences, certainly not a war about the human and civil rights of the oppressed."⁴⁷ There was no real justification for the hasty Slovene secession. Given the overall environment, and the very real threat of violence, Slovenia's secession was an act of blatant self-interest that destroyed the only possible mechanism for peaceful change in Yugoslavia. While the Slovenes and Croats can smugly say that they were rejecting "Serboslavia," they must at the same time admit that they were rejecting peace as well.

Anticipating the likely outcome of a Bosnian secession from Yugoslavia, the United States moved to expedite recognition of Bosnia. By formally making Bosnia an internationally recognized state the United States hoped to dissuade Serbia from acting. The strongest argument for labeling the war in Bosnia as a war of territorial aggression is a direct result of the United States' immediate recognition of the newly declared state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. While this action may have given the Bosnians the justification to say that they were invaded by a foreign state, it did little to mitigate the conflict.⁴⁸ This was a deliberate attempt to preempt Serbian reaction by erecting the shield of international recognition around the new state. The United States had previously argued the opposite point while trying to dissuade Germany from unilaterally recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. Considering Serbia's reaction in those cases, it is difficult to understand the logic of the United States' preemptive recognition policy. In any case, it failed. Acknowledging that Serbia subsidized the Bosnian Serb war effort, or even that they instigated or directed the war effort does not change the fact that the war in Bosnia was essentially a civil war. Serbia's complicity notwithstanding, at its most fundamental level, the war in Bosnia was a civil war of secession involving three ethnonational groups with irreconcilable differences.

WHO'S TO BLAME

Most analysts, both modernists and primordialists alike, blame Serbia for the war. The main distinction between theorists lies in the degree to which Serbia is blamed versus the degree to which Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia are also held responsible.

Norman Cigar, a staunch modernist, places the entire blame on Serbia. This is because he believes that the war was part of a carefully orchestrated master plan to achieve Serb ambitions for a national state. Others such as Susan Woodward, recognize that there were other factors besides Serb nationalism at play. In fact, Woodward rejects both the state aggression and the civil war arguments, saying that the "...collapse had more to do with the transition of a particular constitutional order, its social and economic rights, and a society much transformed over forty years to another type of political order..."⁴⁹

To be sure, aggressive Serb nationalism figured prominently in causing this war, but the political leadership of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia are not blameless. Slovenia shares part of the blame because it acted out of economic self-interest in spite of the knowledge that its actions were likely to trigger a war throughout Yugoslavia. Even with this knowledge and in spite of strong pleas by the United States to resolve its constitutional disputes with Serbia within the framework of the federal government, Slovenia, with strong German backing, chose secession. Slovenia might have been justified in its quest for independence, but it was motivated out of economic self-interest, not a need to defend or protect its citizenry. The Slovenes were not in imminent danger from Serbia. This unilateral move by Slovenia left the other republics with only two options; either follow Slovenia on the path to independence or remain in a Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia. But, as Gompert noted, "...the Slovenes proved indifferent to the fatal consequences for others of their actions."⁵⁰ Few people seem interested in Slovenia's role in sparking these conflicts. Slovenia is currently touted as a shining example of a "reformed" Communist society, and many consider them to be among the top contenders for inclusion in the first round of NATO expansion. But Slovenia's role was similar to that of the motorist whose reckless driving causes a multi-car collision in which there are several deaths, without himself being involved in the actual collision. This motorist wipes his brow, and says "phew" as he drives away from the scene, knowing that he has left carnage behind him on the highway. Later, when the highway

patrol arrives, they have no knowledge of the wreckless driver who caused the accident in the first place, so they investigate only the wrecked vehicles.

It was noted earlier that the United States predicted an armed reaction by Serbia if Slovenia and Croatia seceded because the Serbs refused to live as a minority in Croatia. This implies that only the Serbs were unwilling to accept minority status. This could not be further from the truth. In fact, intransigence on all sides was one of the key factors that led to the conflict, because "not one ethnic group is willing to remain under the political control of another ethnic group."⁵¹ Vladimir Gligorov, a noted Yugoslav political observer was quoted as saying, "Why should we be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in our state?"⁵² The refusal of all ethnic groups to submit to the political authority of any of the other groups left no room for negotiation, and created conditions that made the peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia extremely tricky. The ethnic dissolution of Yugoslavia was further complicated by the geographic spread of the Serb minorities in Croatia and Bosnia, and the Croatian minority in Bosnia, making it infeasible to merely split the republics into three separated ethnic states.⁵³ Each of the three groups considered their potential minority status in a state administered by one of the other ethnic groups as a non-negotiable point. This made secession a zero-sum game for everyone.

In spite of the fact that Croats and Muslims are equally guilty of ethnic intransigence, it is still the Serbs who receive the most blame. Croatia and Bosnia should also be held responsible for their roles in the war. There were no significant Croat, Muslim or Serb minorities in Slovenia so there was little if any ethnonational character to the war with Slovenia. However, beginning with the war in Croatia and continuing to the present, the conflict has taken on a strong ethnonational nature. Here is where it becomes increasingly important to understand the primordial nature of the conflict, because modernism cannot explain the brutality and atrocities that occurred during the war. To understand how ethnic cleansing and other forms of terror could become such a widespread tool of this conflict requires an ability to see the depth of the fears and hatreds endemic to the region.

Just as the *Serbian Memorandum* served as the defining moment of Serb nationalism, it can be said that the "*Croatian Spring*" of 1970-71 served as the defining

moment of Croatian nationalism. Many in the West mistakenly believed that Tito's Yugoslavia was a multi-ethnic state, where the forces of socialism or Tito's personal strength of character, were sufficient to stifle the historic nationalism of the republics. Not only did Tito's Yugoslavia not destroy nationalism, but more to the point, we know that Tito recognized the strength of nationalism, and consciously balanced the nationalism of the republics against one another to suit his purposes. This is what Glenny referred to as "Tito's delicate system of balance between the national groups which was in certain respects a highly sophisticated game of divide and rule."⁵⁴

One of the earliest signs of resurgent Croatian nationalism was the *Declaration on the Croatian Language* issued by a group of Croat intellectuals in 1967. Its purpose was to demand full constitutional recognition of Croatian as the fourth official language of Yugoslavia. The *Language Declaration* inspired a mass Croat nationalist movement that saw the reappearance of Ustasi symbols; reminding Serbs of the atrocities committed against them during the Second World War. This triggered a more aggressive version of Serb nationalism. The expressions of Croat nationalism became so strong and dangerous, that eventually Tito himself took an active role in suppressing them in 1972. If this example seems exaggerated, consider the personal recollections of Drusko Doder, who noted that, "Driving through Serb-populated areas of Croatia in 1974, I found that the envenomed shrillness of both sides had already hardened: 'I can tell you, we'll never be surprised again,' a Kordun Serb told me."⁵⁵ If we had been paying attention, and if we had known what to look for, we would have seen events in the 1970's that did not bode well for the future of a multi-national Yugoslavia. Tito mitigated, but could not totally extinguish the republics' nationalist agendas, therefore, by the 1980's nationalism was thriving in Croatia.

Paul Mojzes tells the story of attending a soccer game between the national teams of Yugoslavia and Holland in Zagreb in 1989. He was appalled as the Croat fans turned their backs to the national flag when the Yugoslav national anthem was played, and cheered for the Dutch team throughout the match. You don't have to be an expert on ethnonationalism to understand the significance of this act. Given the fervor for national-level soccer competition in Europe, this was a major event.

More recently, consider Franjo Tudjman's organized purge of Serbs immediately

following his election as Croatia's first democratically elected president, in April, 1990. As Glenny tells us, in order to rectify the perceived unfair advantages that Serbs had enjoyed in Croatia as part of the Communist legacy, "President Tudjman decided to amend matters by examining nationality as a criterion for the employment of many workers in the state administration. ...When the militant dogs of the HDZ [Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica -Croatian Democratic Union] were unleashed and allowed to organize purges of the state administration, Serbs throughout Croatia were shaken by the spectre of persecution."⁵⁶ Tudjman's purge was not restricted to the Krajina region where most of the rural, militant Serbs lived, but also included the urban areas of Zagreb and other Croatian cities where the so-called "tame Serbs" lived. The symbolism of Ustasi Croatia embodied in modern Croatian nationalism was not lost on the Serbs. For them, these symbols evoked genuine feelings of terror. The final and most decisive factor was Tudjman's refusal to make constitutional guarantees to safeguard the minority rights of Serbs living in Croatia. The Serbs had legitimate grievances and cause for alarm in Croatia. Croatian nationalism was every bit as aggressive as Serbian nationalism, and may have inspired a backlash of Serb nationalism. Hopefully, history will ultimately judge Tudjman as harshly as it does Milosevic due to his personal guilt and complicity in the overall Yugoslav tragedy.

As Croatian nationalism was experiencing its reawakening, Muslim nationalism was experiencing its birth with the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.⁵⁷ Although Noel Malcolm devoted an entire volume to building the case that a Bosnian nation has existed in the region since antiquity, many analysts disagree. Mojzes states that "Contrary to the claims frequently heard from Western journalists, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a well-established nation. There never was a Bosnian nation, although there was briefly a Bosnian state in the Middle Ages."⁵⁸ The significance of acknowledging the brief existence of a *state* while saying that a *nation* never existed is illustrated by Mihailo Crnobrnja's comment that, "One of the most often repeated errors, especially in the first year of the war, was that the Serbs were fighting the Bosnians. There *are* no 'Bosnians' except Muslims, Croats, *and* Serbs living in BiH [Bosnia-Herzegovina]."⁵⁹

The leader of the Muslim nationalist movement was Alija Izetbegovic who not only presumed to speak for the Muslims who lived in Bosnia, but also the two million

Muslims who lived in Kosovo.⁶⁰ In 1970 Izetbegovic wrote a manuscript called the *Islamic Declaration: A Programme of the Islamization of Moslems and Moslem Peoples*. Communist repression of Islam during that period prevented public circulation of the *Declaration*, but it was illegally passed among the Muslims in Bosnia. In 1983, Izetbegovic was jailed for his alleged Islamic fundamentalist and nationalist views. The *Declaration* was not officially published until 1990, but since then, it has been the topic of heated debate. Muslim apologists such as Malcolm dismiss the notion that the *Islamic Declaration* posed a threat to the non-Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia. The chief defense of the *Declaration* is that it is neither fundamentalist, nor was it intended for implementation in Bosnia.

Just below the title in the *Declaration*, is the phrase "OUR GOAL: Islamization of Moslems OUR MOTTO: Believe and Fight." One of its passages reads:

Announcing a revival, we are not announcing an era of security and tranquility, but rather a period of unrest and challenge. There are far too many things that cry out after their destroyers. Therefore, the days to come will not be days of prosperity but rather those filled with dignity. A people which is asleep can only be awoken with blows.⁶¹

Later, Izetbegovic writes that, "Emphasizing as a priority religious and moral revival does not imply -nor can it be interpreted to imply- that Islamic order can be achieved without Islamic rule. This stand only means that our road does not proceed from the conquering of power, but rather from the conquering of people, and that Islamic revival is primarily a revolution in the field of education and only after that in the field of politics."⁶² To his distinct credit, Izetbegovic denounced the use of violence to achieve the transformation to an Islamic society, and he also stated that in those countries where Muslims are not a majority, that they are bound to respect the authority of the state in which they reside, assuming that the laws of the state do not go against the teachings of the Koran. But having said that, it is unmistakably clear from reading the text, that the vision is for the establishment of an Islamic state anywhere that Muslims can achieve control of the social and political instruments of the state.

While the Serbs are generally blamed for the destruction of Bosnia's multi-national consensus, Glenny reminds us that "Alija Izetbegovic and the Moslem leadership also bear a historical responsibility for the breakdown of the consensus between the three Bosnian

communities, for they were the first to organize a political party, the SDA [Stranka Demokratskih Akcije - Party of Democratic Action], along nationalist lines on 26 May 1990."⁶³

Conventional wisdom in the West holds that Bosnia was a highly improbable candidate to become an Islamic state, but from the vantage points of Croats and Serbs who were raised on a steady diet of hate and fear of Islam, they felt terror at the thought of living under the rule of Islam. They clearly felt threatened knowing that the author of the *Declaration* was now their duly elected head of state.

To say that nationalism in Croatia and Bosnia created an environment of fear and anxiety among the Serbs living in those republics is reasonable. Unlike Slovenia, which did not have any significant minorities residing in the other republics, Serbia did have legitimate concerns about the safety and welfare of sizable Serb minorities who lived in Croatia and Bosnia. In Croatia, Serbs had legitimate concern for their physical safety, while in Bosnia, it was the hysteria and paranoid fear of living under Islam. While people in the West can routinely discount Serb fear of Islam, it was very real to the average Serb. Modernist arguments that the war was the result of a diabolical master plan to achieve a "greater Serbia" are guilty of oversimplifying the causes of the war, and they are ascribing far too much credit to Mr. Milosevic's planning ability and powers of persuasion. Susan Woodward made the point that, "The counterintuitive character of such a dynamic can be seen particularly in the outcome of the argument that such aggression in the Yugoslav case was the plan of one man, Slobodan Milosevic. This argument ignores the conditions that make such a leader possible and popular..."⁶⁴ As the former Yugoslav republics moved down the path toward their mutual destruction, Milosevic had plenty of help in stirring up ethnic hatreds. It is interesting to note that the first democratic, multi-party elections held in Yugoslavia; Slovenia, in April 1990, followed by Croatia, in May 1990, both resulted in the election of nationalists.

Establishing the basis for fear, and trying to understand the underlying motivation of the Serbs to fight does not justify their actions but it is helpful in explaining how the war was prosecuted, and may lead to an understanding of what kinds of solutions might lead to a permanent peace. The actions of other republics notwithstanding, the Serbs always had other options besides war. Nonetheless, it is wrong and potentially dangerous

to place the entire responsibility on Serbia. It is wrong because others share a large part of the blame. Furthermore, it is potentially dangerous because if Serbia takes all the blame, others who share nearly as much responsibility will not only escape criticism, but may end up benefitting unfairly. Specifically in this regard, having made Croatia out to be the "good guys," we may unintentionally provide them the means and the cover to pursue additional territorial conquest in Bosnia

It is abundantly clear that the war in the former Yugoslavia was the product of an extremely complex series of misjudgments and nationalist excesses by all of the ethnic nations, yet Serbia continues to take nearly all of the blame. One obvious reason is due to the aggressive nature of Serb nationalism since 1986. As already noted, Serb nationalism was high-profile, but there is another distinction about Serb nationalism that makes it stand out. While nationalism was popular in the other republics, the character of nationalism among Croats, Muslims, and others tended to be secessionist in nature, while Serb nationalism was hegemonistic.⁶⁵ To many observers, the threat of Serbian hegemony appeared to be a worse evil than the unilateral secession and dismemberment of the state.

Another reason why Serbia receives most of the blame can be summed up in the simple statement "that Serb bashing is in at the present time."⁶⁶ This comment by U.S. Army, Brigadier General Mark Hamilton, referred to a point that he was making about the difficulty he had in discerning why ethnic identity could be used as a compelling factor to justify the dissolution of a political state, while it was apparently less appealing to consider that Bosnia-Herzegovina could ever vote to become part of Serbia.⁶⁷

Most unbiased observers would agree that prior to the start of the war, the Serbs had legitimate concerns about human rights guarantees and protection for the Serb minorities who lived in Croatia. However, once the war started the heavy-handed manner in which the Serbs prosecuted the war quickly turned international opinion against them. The use of heavy weapons against unarmed civilians, widespread commission of war crimes; and especially the tactic of "ethnic cleansing" all served to unite much of the world against the Serbs. There is no question that the Serbs are guilty of all of the above, the question is how guilty are they, and are they alone guilty?

Just as the Serbs are not solely responsible for starting the war, they are also not

the only "bad guys" in the war. Since the start of the war there has been an intense campaign to vilify the Serbs. Infrequently, people have attempted to point this out, but the anti-Serb campaign by the media and academics in the United States and elsewhere have successfully drowned out arguments in favor of reason.

One prominent person who argued for fairness was Canadian Major General Lewis MacKenzie. General MacKenzie, served as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) from March 1991 through July 1992. From his vantage point in Sarajevo, General MacKenzie saw a vastly different war than the one that he read about in the Western press and watched on Cable News Network (CNN) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Norman Cigar is highly critical of General MacKenzie's observations from Sarajevo. According to Cigar, General MacKenzie's account of the infamous "bread line" attack in 1991 "mirrored the official version which the Yugoslav government had announced to deflect world criticism, ...He used his version as his proof that all the parties were equally guilty and that the Muslims, in particular, could not be trusted."⁶⁸ This appears to be an unfair attack by Cigar. In fact, in his 1993 book, Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo, MacKenzie gave a very well-balanced account of his experiences in Sarajevo. Cigar stated that MacKenzie "rejected the explanation that the cause had been a mortar shell fired by the Serbs."⁶⁹ What MacKenzie actually said, however, is:

People lined up for bread were attacked, and at least seventeen killed. Presidency [Bosnian] claims it was a Serb mortar attack, Serbs claim it was a set-up using explosives. Our people tell us there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the media were immediately on the scene. The majority of people killed are alleged to be "tame Serbs." Who Knows? The only thing for sure is that innocent people were killed.⁷⁰

The foregoing is a rejection of neither version, but a statement of doubt as to the truth. In a telephone conversation with General MacKenzie, he confirmed to me that although he suspects that the Muslims were responsible for the "bread line" incident, he has never stated that to be the absolute truth because to this day he does not know with certainty. MacKenzie, however, clearly believes that the Muslims are guilty of prolonging the war

and endangering their own citizens. In a briefing to French President Mitterand on 28 June, 1992, General MacKenzie said:

It's in the interests of Izetbegovic to keep the fighting going, in the hope that the world will come to his rescue---provided he can make it look as if the Serbs are solely responsible for perpetrating the chaos. God knows, overall, the majority of the blame does rest with the Serbs; however, whenever we arrange any type of cease-fire, it's usually the Muslims who break it first. In addition, there is strong but circumstantial evidence that some really horrific acts of cruelty attributed to the Serbs were actually orchestrated by the Muslims against their own people, for the benefit of an international audience.⁷¹

The following anecdote can be instructive in showing the veracity of General MacKenzie's accounts. The UNPROFOR had been desperately trying to reopen the Sarajevo airport under UN control in June, 1992. The principal beneficiaries of the aid that would be flown into Sarajevo would be the besieged residents of the city. MacKenzie and his subordinates were frustrated by the fact that each time they negotiated a cease-fire to allow the airport to reopen, one of the sides invariably violated it. One such instance occurred while MacKenzie was coincidentally in a meeting with President Izetbegovic. Upon being informed of the sniper incident, MacKenzie tells us, "I returned to the meeting and told the President in no uncertain terms that the fire had originated from his forces' area in Dobrinja. 'If you can't control your snipers, Mr. President, I will,' was the way I put it. The President replied, 'Please do, General MacKenzie; those elements are out of control. They do not respond to our direction. If you can stop them from firing by any means, we will be pleased.' Great, I thought: now he is authorizing us to kill his own people."⁷² In this exchange, President Izetbegovic not only authorized UNPROFOR to kill his own soldiers, but more to the point, he tacitly acknowledged that his forces had indeed attacked the UNPROFOR soldiers who were trying to deliver relief to his people. At a press conference in July, 1992, just prior to his departure from Sarajevo, MacKenzie was asked why he had said that both sides were equally to blame? MacKenzie responded: "At no time did I say both sides were equally to blame. What I did say was that there's plenty of blame to go around. The Serbs started the shelling and therefore have to accept the majority of the responsibility. But the Presidency has to accept a good deal of the responsibility for keeping the fighting going."⁷³ Throughout

his book MacKenzie avoids being judgmental about the Muslims. While stating that they are guilty of having prolonged the war in an effort to invoke an international military intervention, he also acknowledges that they were in a no-win situation between Croats and Serbs. The question is whether their role as the principal victim entitled them to place their own population in jeopardy and to participate in war crimes of their own.

Another writer who suggested that the Serbs are not the only "bad guys" is retired United States Air Force General Charles G. Boyd. Like MacKenzie, Boyd makes no apology for the Serb role in the war. As a matter of fact, the title of his article, "Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia," acknowledges Serb guilt. As Boyd sees it, "Serb behavior has been reprehensible. The question is how bad? On what scale? and how unique?"⁷⁴ Boyd thinks that American policymakers have attempted to view the war on a simple good versus evil basis. Ethnic cleansing when conducted by Serbs is evil, but when it is conducted by Muslims or Croats, it is justifiable. This is a dangerous approach to policymaking. Boyd cautions, "... to make rational judgments of policy requires a depth of understanding that goes beyond a transient image or sound bite. For some, the war in Bosnia has become a tragedy of proportions that parallel the Holocaust. A case of plain good against stark evil. For these people, the Serbs are the forces of darkness, responsible for most if not all of the atrocities, the ethnic cleansing, mass rapes, concentration camps, and indiscriminate killing."⁷⁵ Boyd's thesis is that any negotiated peace to the war in Bosnia must include consideration of the legitimate Serb demands for self-determination on the same basis that has been extended to the other ethnic groups. As the Serbs become more and more vilified, it becomes increasingly unlikely that their legitimate grievances will be fairly considered.

The viewpoint that the Serbs have legitimate concerns is also repeated by John Sray. He writes that the American public is being deliberately misled about the evil of the Serbs and the virtue of the Bosnian Muslims through the work of two public relations firms, Hill & Knowlton and Ruder Finn, whose work in Bosnia is being financed by wealthy Persian Gulf states.⁷⁶ Sray goes further than either MacKenzie or Boyd in arguing that the Muslims' hands are not clean. His strongest accusation is based on an article by David Binder that appeared in the October 1995 edition of The Nation. Citing Binder's article Sray relates how the mortar attacks against the Sarajevo Markale Market

that occurred on February 5, 1994 and August 28, 1995 were the work of the Bosnian Muslims. Much of the evidence is circumstantial and while he is unable to produce positive proof, Sray suggests that these attacks be investigated by the International War Crimes Tribunal for possible indictments against President Izetbegovic or Vice President Ejup Ganic.⁷⁷

In a separate article that Binder wrote for Foreign Policy (Winter 1994-95) he explained how three preliminary investigating teams came to differing and inclusive findings as to who actually fired the artillery rounds into the Markale Market. The findings of the final investigating team, led by Lieutenant Colonel Michel Gauthier of Canada determined that the round came from a north-northeast direction, and that, "The distance of origin of fire clearly overlaps each side of the confrontation line by 2,000 meters."⁷⁸ Although Binder's investigation falls short of positive proof, he raises some very interesting concerns about the possible culpability of the Muslims. With respect to the Markale Market attack Binder says that "Top-ranking officials of the United Nations and the European Union have confided to this reporter that they are convinced a Muslim unit fired the Mortar. They reason that the Bosnian government had most to gain from the massacre."⁷⁹ But even if Binder cannot fully close the book on the Markale Market bombing, he claims to have seen UNPROFOR reports in which Muslim forces are accused of deliberately firing at Muslim civilians to create incidents which could be blamed on the Serbs.

If there can be honest disagreement among honorable people, one might wonder why there has not been more scrutiny and investigation into atrocities committed by Muslims against their own people? Part of the reason offered by Sray, is that the Western media has deliberately underreported incidents involving Muslim and Croat atrocities, and they have falsely reported many of those incidents as Serb atrocities. In 1993, Professor Carl G. Jacobsen compiled an extensive listing of media misinformation that either purposely or unwittingly vilified the Serbs, in cases where others were to blame. For example, a Newsweek story about President Clinton's May 1993 decision to seek air strikes against Serb positions showed four pages of gruesome photos as a lead-in to the text. Jacobsen points out that three and a half of the four pages show damages inflicted by Croat forces in a battle that had taken place a week earlier in central Bosnia,

but Newsweek left the reader with the clear impression that all of the photos showed Serb-inflicted atrocities.⁸⁰

In addition to the media, certain academics and scholars in the United States have contributed to the vilification of the Serbs. Norman Cigar accuses the Serbs of planning and executing a deliberate policy of genocide to achieve their strategic objective of establishing a "greater Serbia." It is difficult to argue against Cigar without being labeled a Serb apologist, or being accused of minimizing the brutality of ethnic cleansing. Nobody of conscience can accept any excuse for the wanton murder of innocent people. There is almost universal agreement that the butchers and war criminals must be brought to justice. Having said that, however, it is a stretch to equate the ethnic cleansing that occurred in the former Yugoslavia to the genocide that was planned and executed by NAZI Germany. Cigar warns that, "A number of observers in the media and academia in the West, too, insisted specifically that what was occurring, although perhaps deplorable, was certainly not genocide. Their argument ranged over a wide area, with their evidence often stacked for cumulative effect and redolent with euphemisms as they sought to downplay the situation."⁸¹ Cigar tries to discredit an article by *Washington Post* columnist Paul Cohen, who argued that no matter how indefensible the ethnic cleansing is, it does not constitute genocide because there is no attempt to eradicate the Muslim people. Cigar refutes all of Cohen's points except the question of intent. Cigar tells us that genocide is not determined by whether or not the victim group is defenseless, and he also correctly states that the number of people murdered is not essential to the definition. He says that "What is key is the willful destruction or attempted destruction of large numbers of people innocent of any specific crime other than belonging to a certain group. There is compelling evidence that the Serb authorities did indeed desire and plan for the elimination by various methods of the Bosnian Muslims' presence in its entirety and openly argued in support of that policy."⁸² In spite of Cigar's eloquent articulation, he never addresses the key issue, which is "...the intent to destroy by means of the commission of that act, or with the intent to carry out a plan to destroy, the whole or a substantial part of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group...."⁸³ The critical element that is missing is the "intent to destroy" the Muslims as an ethnic group. The International War Crimes Tribunal obviously believes there is sufficient evidence to

support indictments of genocide against Karadic and Mladic, but it remains to be seen if a conviction can be won. There is no doubt that the Serbs deliberately set out to terrorize, and cause the Muslims to leave Serb controlled areas, but their intent all along was the departure, not the extermination of the Muslims. The NAZIS, on the other hand, set about the task of eradicating an entire race of people. They succeeded in exterminating approximately six million Jews before they were stopped. It is not moral equivalency to argue that these are not the same crimes. No matter how horrendous the acts of ethnic cleansing were, they amount to mass murder, but not genocide. By equating the Serbs to the Nazis, and by invoking the emotion that accompanies the use of the term genocide, Cigar and others like him seek to dehumanize the Serbs to a point where nobody will be concerned about their rights and legitimate grievances.

By deciding that the Serbs are the "bad guys" in the war and especially after accusing them of genocide, many people automatically concluded that all of their enemies are the "good guys." This simplification of "good guys" and "bad guys" leads to the formulation of "bumper sticker" diplomacy that can be easily articulated to the public, but is not helpful in finding solutions to the war, because it masks the underlying causes that led to the war in the first place. Because we have decreed the Serbs to be "bad" their views will not be properly considered at the negotiation table. After all, negotiating with people who are guilty of genocide would be appeasement. Perhaps Bogdan Denitch said it best: "*To differing degrees* [emphasis added] all these people are responsible for the mass slaughter and physical destruction that have driven the Yugoslav states, individually and collectively, from the doorstep of Europe to the fringes of the Third World."⁸⁴

CAN DAYTON ENDURE

In discussing the war, modernists can explain what happened: "The immediate cause lay in the assertion of Serbian nationalism within the established borders of a Yugoslav state. That undermined those constitutional arrangements guaranteeing the rights of non-Serbs. Without such guarantees, other republics moved to break away, thereby exposing the position of Serbs living outside of Serbia itself."⁸⁵ The problem with modernism is that while it explains *what* happened, it does not lead to an understanding of *why* things happened. To gain an understanding of how and why the violence that

occurred in the former Yugoslavia was not only possible, but also likely and predictable, one must consider the primordial roots of the conflict.

Cigar is critical of writers who argued that the conflict is "little more than a continuation of endemic communal strife in the area, and that history has been the principal, if not exclusive, genesis of today's events." According to Cigar: "History, of course, has helped to form the background against which recent events have taken place and can help us understand them. However, history has not been, as some have suggested, the deterministic factor."⁸⁶ Mr. Cigar seems to miss the point. A survey of the literature failed to yield any pure "primordialists" who viewed the cultural and ethnic history as deterministic. To the contrary, most of the writers that urge an understanding of history, acknowledge that history helps us to understand the thinking that may have influenced a particular event, but it doesn't cause the event. History did not cause ethnic cleansing to be used in the war, but an understanding of history can help to explain *how* such an atrocity could occur.

William T. Johnsen is an articulate spokesperson for using history to correctly interpret contemporary issues. Consider the following passage:

[His was] the colossal conceit of thinking that you could suddenly make international life over into what you believed to be your own image, when you dismissed the past with contempt, rejected the relevance of the past to the future, and refused to occupy yourself with the real problems that a study of the past would suggest.⁸⁷

As Johnsen tells us, the above passage could easily apply to any of the people who, today, try to impose simplistic solutions on the Yugoslav crisis without having an appreciation of the complex and long-standing circumstances that led to the crisis. As it turns out, however, the passage is not contemporary, but is a quote from George F. Kennan who was criticizing President Woodrow Wilson's performance at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.⁸⁸ Often it seems that Americans do not show an acceptable knowledge and appreciation of history. Perhaps the young age of the United States, or the unique circumstances of its development have created a false faith in humanity and a belief that what was accomplished here can easily be replicated elsewhere. Americans fought a bloody civil war, 1861-1865, to decide whether states had the right to secede.

It was the most horrific war of America's history, but after a period of reconstruction and reconciliation an even stronger union emerged. Americans cannot fathom the wars of Europe and look with contempt upon what is considered here, to be Europe's inability to resolve its own differences. Many Americans can not understand the significance of ethnic symbols that can evoke strong reactions in a Serb when he sees reminders of the Ustasi, or when a Croat is reminded of the Chetniks. Yet, the reappearance of those symbols in Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s had a devastating effect on Serbs and Croats alike. Perhaps this is what Johnsen meant when he wrote that "Ethnic identity is a critical concept for U.S. leaders to understand. American political leaders and their advisors may not fully appreciate the importance of ethnic or national identity to many Europeans..."⁸⁹ Many Americans grew up with the great myth of the "American melting-pot," where a multitude of nationalities and ethnic groups were happily and peacefully assimilated into a new American identity. We know from recent events in the Balkans that ethnic groups are not always assimilated happily and peacefully. Johnsen, and others like him do not suggest that the history of the Balkans caused the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia. Their point is that by understanding the cultural and ethnic history of the region, policymakers will be better equipped to devise reasonable policies that may eventually lead to solutions.

Perhaps a few examples of ethnic reality from the Balkans will clarify the importance of understanding the historic, cultural, tribal, and communal background of a conflict. In his famous travelogue, Balkan Ghosts, Robert Kaplan tells of the following encounter:

"You don't know what it is to kill with a hammer, with nails, clubs, do you?" Ismail shouted above the music, his face flashing purple from blinking, Day-Glo lights. I was still in Pec, in Old Serbia, in a disco frequented by Muslim Albanians, not far from the Serbian monastery. "Do you know why I don't like to drink plum brandy, why I drink beer always? Because the Chetniks [World War II Serbian partisans] used to do their killing after drinking plum brandy. Do you know what it is to throw a child in the air and catch it on a knife in front of its mother? To be tied to a burning log? To have your ass split with an axe so that you beg the Serbs, beg them, to shoot you in the head and they don't? And they go to their goddamn church. I have no words..." Ismail shuddered. "There are things that go beyond evil, that you just can't speak about." He went on shouting. Ismail was only twenty-six; he had no personal knowledge of the events he described. Rats infest his house, he told me. The Serbs were to blame.⁹⁰

This conversation took place long before the recent war, but it is illustrative of the importance of cultural myths in perpetuating ethnic fears and hatreds. Ismail never personally witnessed any Serb atrocities in his lifetime, yet his emotional understanding of Serb behavior is just as real to him as if he had actually witnessed those events. Undoubtedly, Ismail believed every word that he said. Here is another great example:

"What happened here yesterday?" you ask the "cleansers" who took over the ruins. "Well, in 1389..." explains a Serb irregular fighter while waving a gun. "no, not in 1389: yesterday," you interrupt..."Under the Ottoman Empire..." he tries again. "No, please! What happened yesterday?" You get impatient. "Because in 1921, they..." You cannot give up, of course, so you sigh and try again, until you get his version of the events.⁹¹

To the average Serb, Croat, or Muslim every historical "fact" is inexorably linked to a multitude of other historical "facts." The cultural history is handed down from generation to generation as a composite of fact, fiction, and myth. Over time, it becomes increasingly more difficult to distinguish the fact from fiction, even for the nationalists themselves. Given that the people who live there are raised to believe these myths as the absolute truth, how then, does a Krajina Serb feel when he hears the following:

This country can only be a Croatian country, and there is no method we would hesitate to use in order to make it truly Croatian and *cleanse* [added emphasis] it of Serbs, who have endangered us and who will endanger us again if they are given the opportunity.⁹²

This passage could have been overheard last week, but it is actually a quote of Milovan Zanic from May 2, 1941, while he was Minister of the Legislative Council of the Independent State of Croatia. The enduring nature of ethnic hatred and fear should not be underestimated. One final example shows that ethnic cleansing has deeper roots than we may have earlier imagined:

Houses and whole villages reduced to ashes, unarmed and innocent populations massacred *en masse*, incredible acts of violence, pillage and brutality of every kind-such were the means which were employed and are still employed by the Serbo-Montenegrin soldiery, with a view to the entire transformation of the ethnic character of [these] regions.⁹³

If you are like Cvijeto Job, you too may have thought that this was an account of recent ethnic cleansing in Croatia or Bosnia, but as Job tells us, this quote is taken from a

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report that was written in 1941.

Perfect knowledge of Yugoslavia's cultural and ethnic history might not have prevented the war, but this knowledge can guide us to an understanding of the behavior of the warring factions. This behavioral understanding is essential in formulating policy that makes sense and has a chance of succeeding. Apparently, the Bush administration had a thorough understanding of the situation that was unfolding in Yugoslavia in 1990. David Gompert explains that they were well aware of the dangers facing Yugoslavia, and they predicted that any breakup of Yugoslavia was bound to be violent. That is the main reason why they supported the continuation of a unified Yugoslavia.⁹⁴ That is just one example of how policy judgments can be affected by knowledge of the primordial roots of a conflict.

The definition of success for the Dayton Accord is simple. Success equals peace. More specifically, from the United States perspective, success is achieved if the resulting peace also satisfies American foreign policy objectives. The remainder of this analysis will define success in terms of U.S. objectives, and will evaluate the potential for successful fulfillment of those objectives.

American policy toward the former Yugoslavia is focused on five goals: sustaining a political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples; preventing the spread of the conflict into a broader Balkan war; stemming the flow of refugees from the conflict; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping to support NATO's central role in Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.⁹⁵ The Dayton Accord potentially achieves all but the first of these objectives. The war was contained within Bosnia, and it is clear that the slaughter of the innocents has stopped, and with it the flow of refugees out of the war zone has been brought under control. American participation in the NATO IFOR is the cornerstone to NATO's policy toward the region. If the United States had not taken the decision to participate in IFOR, then the overall NATO mission might have been scrapped. Although NATO officially states that "The Future of NATO is not contingent on this operation...",⁹⁶ many believe otherwise. Whether you believe its survival is contingent on success or not, few would argue that if IFOR successfully implements a permanent peace, then the relevance of NATO as a force for continued

stability in Europe will be enhanced. While there is apparent success in achieving four of the stated policy objectives, preservation of the territorial integrity of Bosnia could prove problematic.

Success can be boiled down to whether or not a peace plan can be implemented that satisfies the U.S. policy objectives of preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia while simultaneously guaranteeing a viable future for all three ethnic groups. This is the long pole in the tent. To put the bad news up front such a plan seems unlikely at the present. There are many reasons for believing this, but the most obvious one that comes to mind is that the gashes from the last four years have cut too deeply into the fabric of Bosnian society. There was little trust between ethnic groups before the war, but there is no trust now. Without minimum trust, Croats, Muslims and Serbs will not be capable of living together unsupervised by NATO or the international community.

The underlying concept of the Dayton Accord is for the NATO IFOR to: "1) separate the armies; 2) ensure the cease-fire; 3) make sure rival troops and their weaponry are withdrawn to designated areas; and, 4) create a stable environment so that other organizations have the opportunity to fulfill the civilian tasks associated with the Peace Agreement."⁹⁷ So far, actions to implement the first three tasks have occurred on schedule, and have been successful. The creation of a stable environment is more questionable.

As noted earlier, the one-year mandate for IFOR was based upon the assumption that the cycle of violence could be broken, and that enough of the civilian reconstruction measures could be implemented to keep the peace process moving after the departure of IFOR around December 1996. The first concern raised by this assumption is that the cycle of violence can be broken in a year's time. Senator John McCain expressed serious doubt about the one year period saying, "I don't think that twelve months is long enough to break a cycle of violence that has been going on for five hundred years, and some would argue one thousand years."⁹⁸ From a modernist perspective, if the cycle of violence is defined as armed conflict, then a year may be sufficient. However, looking at it from a primordialist point of view, one considers the recent past and wonders if the need for revenge will re-ignite the cycle of violence through widespread acts of terror and retribution.

In a three-way civil war where all sides committed atrocities, and where none of the sides is completely satisfied with the outcome of the war, there is a high degree of risk that revenge will play a key role after the departure of IFOR. The track records of the leadership of all three groups during the war was extremely poor in terms of their ability to control their own forces.

In May 1992, there was an incident in Sarajevo where Bosnian President Izetbegovic fell into the hands of the YPA. Through the personal efforts of General MacKenzie, an agreement was reached between the YPA and the Bosnian Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) to allow the safe passage of the YPA headquarters element out of Sarajevo in exchange for the safe return of President Izetbegovic. As the convoy made its way through the crowded streets of the city it was ambushed by soldiers of the TDF. Fortunately, the Chief of Staff of the TDF was on hand at the ambush site, and personally intervened to stop the ambush. A radio conversation between the TDF commander and the officer in charge of the ambush was taped, and broadcast in December, 1995 as part of a Discovery Channel special news production on Yugoslavia. In the taped interview, you can hear the ambush leader refuse to obey the orders of the TDF commander.⁹⁹ How much better will all sides be able to control disgruntled factions after IFOR departs?

A critical element in defusing the revenge factor will be the ability to demonstrate to all of the parties that justice will be served. Edward Joseph from the Council on Foreign Relations put it this way in a television interview in December:

There is no necessary contradiction between justice and achieving peace, certainly not in the short run, and ironically both in the medium term and in the long run, it actually may help. Justice Goldstone made a very interesting point. He said that if they prosecute successfully, those who have been responsible for war crimes, it actually could help the societies come back together because there's less of an opportunity for people to presume collective guilt.¹⁰⁰

Justice Goldstone's point is very important to the overall peace process. In an area that has historically shown a strong penchant for revenge, it is critical that the justice system act swiftly to demonstrate that the guilty will be made to pay. Whether this can be accomplished at all is questionable, but it is extremely unlikely that much progress will have been made in this regard within the first year.

There are numerous obstacles to justice, none the least of which is the continuing

campaign to dehumanize the Serb side of the war. There is no question that top Bosnian Serb leaders such as Karadic and Mladic must be brought to justice, but care must be taken not to accuse the entire Serb nation. Support for the idea that the Serbs must also be treated fairly comes from some unexpected sources. Take for example, this statement by David Rhode, a reporter from the Christian Science Monitor who had been held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs. "...One of the problems in the Western media is we portray them [Bosnian Serbs] as extreme, and I think in actuality, it is the extremists that we need to eliminate from the Bosnian Serbs."¹⁰¹ Taken in context, his point is that we must not paint all Serbs with the brush of extremism.

This nagging question of how to deal with the Bosnian Serbs will not go away. There is wide consensus that Karadic and Mladic, among several others, are war criminals, but that should not detract from the Serbs' legitimate grievances in the war. Unfortunately, the behavior of Serbs who committed atrocities seems to overshadow all else.

The United States is in a particularly uncomfortable position. As one of our stated policy objectives, we have declared the goal of maintaining a unitary, Bosnian state. The Bosnian Serbs are unlikely to ever accept this, and the compromise veneer of federation is just a stepping stone to eventual Bosnian Serb autonomy or independence. It will be interesting to see how future American policy will bend to accept this eventuality.

U.S. policy toward the sides in the war is also confusing. During an appearance on the television news magazine "Sixty Minutes," on December 10, 1995, President Clinton made it clear that the United States was not a neutral third party in the peace process. In responding to a question by Morley Safer, asking how the United States could claim to be neutral, while simultaneously deciding to arm and train the Bosnian government army, President Clinton said, "Everybody knows what all of our sympathies are. I'm on record repeatedly saying that I think the Serbs bear the heaviest responsibility, for they started the war."¹⁰² Having clearly stated that our national sympathies lay with the Muslims puts us "on their side." There is a contradiction in our national policy to favor the Muslim side while simultaneously leading a NATO IFOR whose formal policy is for neutral and even-handed treatment of all the parties.¹⁰³ There have already been minor difficulties where IFOR has had to criticize the Muslims for

failure to comply with provisions of the agreement. So far none of these incidents have created problems for the United States, but if a significant issue were to arise, the potential for controversy exists. It is exceptionally tricky to fairly and impartially implement the terms of an agreement when you have decisively stated your preference for one of the parties.

Another exceptionally tricky area is the question of elections. One the most important provisions of the Dayton Accord was the agreement by all the sides to hold elections for a rotating presidency and a multi-ethnic parliament within six to seven months. As pointed out in a recent issue of Foreign Report, this is a questionable requirement. "The Europeans have privately argued for a couple of weeks that to try to hold elections will at best be reckless and at worst will send back to parliament the extremists whom everyone wants to eliminate from Bosnia's political life."¹⁰⁴ This is a new state carved out of three hostile and different ethnic nations. None of the ethnic groups involved ever achieved a civic culture at any time in their history, and they have no tradition of respect for human rights or other democratic values. The first free elections held in the region resulted in the election of former communists as the heads of state in all of the former Yugoslav republics, with the exception of President Izetbegovic, in Bosnia. Furthermore, all of the elected heads of state, including Izetbegovic, are nationalists and contributed to the events leading up to this war. After IFOR's departure, who will restrain the nationalist extremists? Technically, some mechanical representation of an election can occur, but the quality of the product of that election may lead to further problems in the future. Because the elections took place under the auspices of the Dayton Accord, people will claim that they had the tacit approval of the United States and Europe.

Another potential problem for the long term prospects for the Dayton Accord is the American policy of arming and training the Bosnian army. In theory, the reasons for doing this sound valid. The principle element of the arm and train strategy is a belief that the Bosnian army was severely outgunned by the Bosnian Serbs, and that the only way to ensure their future survival, and to prevent a renewed Serb attack after the departure of IFOR is to level the playing field. Senator John McCain, member of the House Armed Services Committee summarizes the arguments in favor of the arm and train policy: "Part

of the reason, an important part of the reason this war started in the first place, was because of the dramatic imbalance in arms between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs. Therefore, when we leave at the end of the year, we would like for there not to be that sort of an imbalance."¹⁰⁵ This is balance of power politics that assumes that the actors will act rationally and not initiate a conflict against superior forces. It is thought that if all the sides are reasonably balanced, that no side will perceive an advantage over the other. If this rationale had prevailed in the first place, the war never would have occurred. Slovenia stood no chance in an all-out war against Serbia in 1991, yet they took a tremendous risk in their unilateral act of secession. Also, as Bogdan Denitch put it, the Krajina Serbs in 1990 were "notoriously quarrelsome and generally well-armed frontiersmen," and he tells us that it was "certainly a very bad idea for the Croatian nationalists...to pick a fight" with them.¹⁰⁶ Balkan history shows more of a propensity for making conflict decisions on the basis of emotion rather than balance. If the perceived grievance is severe enough, any one of these ethnic groups is capable of making a decision to enter into conflict on purely emotional grounds, regardless of the military balance. Arming and training the Bosnian army forces the United States to choose sides and may make it increasingly difficult to deal in good faith with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats in future negotiations. Also, if the Bosnian Serbs believe that the Muslims are becoming too well-armed, they might launch a preemptive attack to weaken the Muslims before they become overwhelmingly strong. Lastly, there is also the possibility that once armed and trained, and after the departure of IFOR, that the Muslims will decide to win back through the use of force, territory lost to the Serbs and Croats at Dayton.

After four years of war in the former Yugoslavia the United States was instrumental in bringing the warring parties together to achieve a negotiated peace. This war had eluded a negotiated settlement for such a long period because the causes for the war were extremely complex. Repeated efforts by Europeans and Americans alike had failed to accomplish what was achieved at Dayton following 21 days of intense negotiation. The Dayton Accord does not promise peace. President Clinton often remind us that the Dayton Accord merely provides a framework that will allow the parties to make peace. It is repeatedly emphasized that the peace process can only continue if the

parties want it to continue. A logical corollary would be to say that a permanent peace is dependent on the continued good will of the parties, but grudging acquiescence is not the same as goodwill. The Dayton Accord will ultimately fail because it imposes a purely modernist approach that ignores the primordial effects of cultural and ethnic factors that contributed to the start of the war in the first place. First, there is insistence on the restoration and maintenance of a unitary Bosnian state within its present borders. But with that as an objective, the Accord actually established one sovereign state consisting of two entities: the Federation, which is a combination of Bosnian Muslims and Croats; and the Bosnian Serb Republic.¹⁰⁷ In reality, it is highly unlikely that the Bosnian Serb Republic will submit to the sovereignty of the Federation after the withdrawal of IFOR. There is an equally strong possibility that the fragile Croat-Muslim Federation will quickly fall apart, with the Croats seeking some form of union or federation with Croatia. Where all this could lead cannot be known, but the possibility of renewed conflict seems high.

This war was fought because all three ethnic groups refused to live under the rule of either of the other groups, yet the Accord seeks to impose a multi-national solution. The only chance for a permanent peace at this point lies in the establishment of separate ethnic states. In his book on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz states that the notion of ethnic partitioning is revolting, but sometimes unavoidable:

If partition is a bad idea, it does not follow that all available weapons should be brought to bear to avert the undesirable result. Partition is likely to be a bloodier event than it looks on paper. Even those divorces that proceed more or less by consent, such as the partition of India in 1947, may take an enormous toll in lives. "Population transfer" only *sounds* hygienic. Still, protracted civil violence may be worse, and prudential judgments will have to be made. The point is not that partition is always avoidable, on that, with rare exceptions, it ought to be not the policy of choice but of desperation.¹⁰⁸

The United States is stubbornly trying to avoid supporting any solution that appears to ratify ethnic cleansing, or ethnic partitioning. The result is a peace agreement that leaves unsettled, the basic questions that drove the groups to war in the first place. American concerns are justified, and their intentions may be honorable, but the imposition of a modernist solution to a primordial problem is bound to fail.

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